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Be~gium provides an especiall;i7 interesti~g subject for the 
study of foodstuffs_ production, SU}?ply, _and consumption duri~g 
World War II. Of all the nations in New Order Europe, _it was 
the least able to feed itself, that is, to survive under the 
conditions of agricultural autarchy imposed by the Germans in 
the food-dependent nations which they occupied. Prewar Belgium 
- -
imported over one-half of its total consumption requirements, 
1 
mainly from overseas. But the nation's .vulnerability to 
blockade or embargo was greater than even this round _figure 
would suggest, since feedgrains accounted for the bulk of 
foodstuffs imports. Before the war, 79 percent and 75 percent 
respectively of national fat and protein consumption requirements-
depended·on fodder from foreign sources. The ratio of Belgian 
farmland per capita, the lowest in Europe, put the nation at a 
second great disadvantage. In Belgium 457 persons had to be 
fed from 100 hectares as compared for instance with 372 in the 
Netherlands. 2 A third disadvantage was historical in character: 
, at once a Continental outpost of Manchestertum and at the same 
time divided into warring language factions, Belgium lacked 
traditions of the sort that might have facilitated the imposition 
of central controls over the agricultural economy. These 
disadvant~ges were nonetheless overcome during the occupation. 
·The Be;tgian public, _hu~g-ry and debilitated though it was, _did 
not experience famine in the months between June 1940 and August 
1944. Nor did it suffer on a serious scale any ~alady worse than 
undernourishment. How was it in fact able to survive? 
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The question has a wider relevance than appears evident at 
first blush. It is often maintained in Belgium that economic 
colla,bbration, the so-called "Politics of J?roquction, 11 was the 
inevitable consequence of a dependence on foodstuffs imports. 3 
To secure the agricultural_ goods necessary for survival, the 
argument holds, it was necessary to produce manufactures for 
the German war economy. It is, however, evident at a_glance 
that Belgium received very little indeed in the way of foodstuffs 
as compensation for its sales of industrial_ goods to German 
buyers. They have been estimated at between two-thirds·and three-
quarters of total output. 4 As for the foodstuffs imports, 
Jean Colard-in L'Alimentation de la Belgique sous l'Occupation 
Allemande 1940-1944 ~stimates that for breadgrain, the most 
important import product, Belgium received over the period as 
a whole. from all sources some 870,350 tons, of which 637,988 
tons came from the Reich. 5 Total breadgrain imports for the 
occupation, in other words, equalled about three-quarters of 
the 1935-1938 annual average of 1.28 million tons. (There were 
no imports of feedgrains.) Taking account of exports to- the 
Reich, Brandt estimates net Belgian food imports, expressed in 
. grain equivalents, at 240,000 tons. 6 But consideration must 
also be given in the food balance to consumption by Germans in 
the Command Area (Befehlsbereich) of Belgian·agricultural 
·';} products. A.t a minimum, this amounted to twice Belgium 1 s food 
exI?orts to the Reich. Germans, it seems, ate more Belgian food 
during the occupation than Belgians German! It must also be 
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emphasized that over the per·iod from 1940 to 1944, _the nation's 
food imports fell sharply, while at the same time the sale of 
industrial products to German buyers rose. Tonn~ge imports 
from all sources of wheat, _rye, flour, .and s·tarches decx:eased 
from 434,J,16 i.n 1940-41, .to 211,661 in 1941-42, _to 77,140 in 
· 1942-43, _while increasing slightiy to 127,453 in 1943-44. 7 
To be sure, such figure_s, estimates, and approximations as the 
above leave a good deal unsaid about the Belgian food supply. 
They do, however, point inescapably to.the conclusion that 
during the occupation, particularly in the later years, the 
nation managed to feed itself largely by means of its own resources. 
It is,· in other words, appropriate to ask whether, from the 
standpoint of Belgium's food requirements, it _was in fact . · 
necessary for the land to become the armorer of the Reich. 
Reich food policy towards Belgium, to the extent that there 
was one, rested with the civil affairs executive (Military 
Administration) of the Militarbefehlshaber in Belgien und Nord-
frankreich, the occupation government in _power from May 1940 
to July 1944. Its task was to see to it .that the approximately 
, 6.8 million non-farm Belgians received ~hat Berlin had a~rived 
at as the minimum daily per capita food consumption requirements 
. 8 
needed for human maintenance, namely 1200-:1300 calories a day. 
(];>reference was of course to be given persons working directly 
in the. interests of the Reich.) This figure. represented about 
half the desirable minimum and slightly less than forty percent 
of average pre-war Belgian consumption. To attain even this 
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pitifully low ration level. would, _however, _have req~ired additional 
annual output (or importation) of .some soo;o_oo tons of wheat, 
60,000 tons of rye, .?J.nd 260, o_oo tons of barl·ey, _to mention only 
the most important of imported carbohydrates. It would also have 
required bo~h equitable distribution and restraints on the 
consumption_of non-Belgians in the Command Area. 
In pursuit of these aims, the Military Administration had 
to face huge problems, not the least of which was its own lack 
of power. With a staff of less than a thousand and few influential 
supporters in Berlin, it had little voice in European food policy 
and could exercise only limited control over the economic behavior· 
of Wehrmacht units and personnel stationed in the Command Area. 
It also h:..~ no choice but to depend.en Belgia!l:;. ·to do the ac-t'.lal 
work of administering the agricultural economy. 9 
But in this respect, the nation's traditions presented real 
difficulties. Since responsibilities for food production and 
suppl.y were divided, the Mil.itary Administration found itself 
having to create a new super~agency, the Corporation Nationale_ 
de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture (CNAA),to administer the 
agricultural economy. The new organization was, however, weak. 
As a result, the Military Administration, with Belgian adrninistrators 
in tow, _moved with· great caution in setting policy. They did 
not in particul.ar risk imposir1g the one fundamental measure 
~ necessary to step up agricultural self-_suffici.ency. It was to 
increase production of crops for direct human consumption-by 
convetting a portion of Belgium's surprisingli large area of 
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grazing·land to farmland~ Belgo-German farm administrators 
also .did surl?risingly litUe to introduce n.ew crops into 
cultivation. To regulate output, the ~ilitary Administration 
and CNAA relied mainly on delivery quotas. These were, however, 
set low and made flexible eno~gh to leave peasant cultivators 
with substantial surplusses to dispose of, albeit for reasons. 
of·prestige this fact could never be operily·admitted. 
The official food policy, while hardly adeqµate, cannot be 
described as a total failure. supplies of agricultural goods 
increased steadily during the occupation. In Winter and Spring 
1941, mass starvation was an imminent danger; thereafter it.became 
increasingly less difficult to meet targeted ration levels. Even 
so, hunger might well have .become famine had not huge amounts of 
unofficial output entered the market. By all odds, it was equal 
in amount ·to that distributed by the authorities. This additional 
production derived from the surplusses of peasant cultivators, 
the yields of "miniplots," home gardens and public lands, and 
from the traffic of smuggl:ers. Doubtless there were enormous 
inequities in the distribution of this food. It is nonetheless 
incontrovertible that for the urban public of the occupied land 
the marche clandestin--the black market--provided the margin of 
survival. 
A, discussion of the food problems of occupied Belgium must . 
;: really b~gin by emphasizing the criminal ind"ifference with which-
Berlin viewed the whole matter except, that is, until shortages 
threatened to disrupt-production. Four Year Plan simply 
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ordered the Military Administration to see to it that Be;t.gium 
feed itself. Neither it nor any other German min,istry or agency 
made any serious attempt to determine if such a thing were 
actually J?Ossible, .offered assistance in raising domestic production, 
or support in .. gaini~g access to fore~gn sources of foodstuffs.· 
The efforts of both the Military Administration and the leaders 
of Belgian business and the civil service to secure Berlin's 
recognl tio·n of Belgium's special foodstuffs n.eeds all fell on 
deaf ears. ·Nor was the OKW particularly helpful.in disciplining 
the economic behavior of the Wehrmacht units stationed in the 
Command Area. The Reich in fact deviated only once from its 
insistence that Belgium should take care of its own food problems. 
This happened as a result of the na~r-famine of Wintet·and Spring 
1941, which touched off miner strikes throughout the Borinage 
and Li~gebasins, and for a time even jeopardized the "Politics 
of Production." The most abiding concern of the Reich with 
\ 
regard to Belgian agriculture was, however, to cream off any 
f~od surplusses above the minimum necessary for ~uman maintenance. 
Beyond that, it simply left the Military Administration free to 
struggle as best it could with the intractable food problems of· 
the occupied land. 
Berlin's lack of support together with the general food 
shoJ;t~ges in Europe and disruptions due to military events are 
',. responsi.ble ;f;or the ''pi tif'ully inadequate II resul. ts of the many 
attempts of the Military Administration, _some·of them through 
Belgian intermediaries, to secure a reliable foreign source of 
-7-
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staple products. The first failure was the effort to organize 
an American food mission on the pattern ot the World War I 
Committee for the Relief of Be~gium. A_general air of unreality 
overhangs the whole affair. In-January 1941, several figures 
from the "Hoover circle" arrived in Brussels •to study the Belgian 
food situation.". With the encour~gement of the Military Administration, 
the head of the Belgian Red Cross and a pre-war diplomat, one 
Prince de Ligne, were dispatched to Lisbon to conduct negotiations. 
A representative of the delegation apparently even succeeded in 
gaining passage to Washington. Although discussions persisted 
intermittently throughout the year, nothing haa been resolved 
when, because of the entrance of the United·states into-the war, 
contacts were broken off. 11 
The failure to revive Belgium's prewar exchange of industr.ial 
goods for French and Dutch agricultural products was a much more 
serious matter~ Part of the p:i::-oblem with regard to France was. 
_the priority which the Franco-German Armistice Commission in 
Wiesbaden accorded French grain exports to the Reich and to 
the Wehrmacht in France, some 800,000 tons per year. Colard's 
figures indicate that cereal imports from France were comparatively 
insignificant. From mid-1940 to mid-1941 they amounted to 54,679 
tons of_ grain and from mid-1941 to mid-1942 to 10,000 tons. In 
1942-.1943 and in 1943-.1944 France exported to Belgium 15,222 
" and is,012 tons of -flour respectively. 12 The Military Administration's 
final report notes, in addition, that France consistently ran 
huge trade deficits with Belgium, in the end amounting to 328 
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million RM less than total Be~gian exports to France o;e 842 . 
million RM. Wine was by far the most important rrench export 
to _Belgium. It reached 342,7_39 hl or more than twice pre'-war 
levels and totalled some 60.5 million RM in value. Approximately 
two-thirds of this barrel~ge was re-_exported from Belgium to the 
Reich, _and rnos_t of the rest apparently consumed on the spot by 
Wehrmacht personnel. 13 In the Dutch case, the results, with one 
exception, were even sorrier. With the exception.of a critical 
shipment of 60,000 tons of seed-potatoes in 1941, the 80 million: 
RM in pre-war Belgian agricultural imports from the Netherlands 
all but disappeared during the occupation. This was a matter of 
great bitterness on the part of the Military Administration. It 
protested to Berlin on numerous occasions the injustice_of 
permitting stubborn Dutchmen to eat better than the more compliant 
Belgians. 14 Its final report cited numerous instances in which 
the Reichskommissariat Niederlande had sabotaged trade agreements. 
With regard to a third possible source of staple imports, 
Eastern Europe, results were somewhat more ambivalent. Belgian 
trade with the USSR did not get past the introductory stages. 
After lengthy negc;,tiations in Moscow, _agreement -was reached to 
import 120,000 tons of wheat, 55,000 tons of rye arid various other 
commodities totalling to some 40 million RM in value. The German 
invasion of the soviet Union unfortunately prevented execution 
of.the deal, and virtually no foodstuffs reached occupied Belgium 
15 from tha~ source. · Belgian participation in the 1942 Kriegsmesse 
in Budapest opened the way for the most successful trade agreement 
" 
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of the occu!?a tion, _one wi,th Hu~g-ary. Iri excha.;-ige £:or the sale 
of certain Belgian assets in that country and additional amounts 
of machinery, Hu!3-_gary agreed in 1943 and 1944 to send over the 
Belgian Winterhilfswerk some 27 million RM in goods including . 
15., 500 ·tons of wheat, nearly all of which appears to have been 
delivered. 16 
The Military Administration's.·greatest failure was, o~ cours~,· 
the inability to "awakeri the Reich to its export res pons ibi-li ties. " 
To be sure, a certain amount of exportation was unavoidable, 
especially of feedgrains in the period of transition to autarchy. 
In the first year of occupation Germany sent 279 million tons 
of cereals (as compared to the 1,208.9 million tons imported 
annually between 1935 and, 19.38} •-· This .figure was soon w.orked 
down, however:_ to 172 million tons in 1941-1942 and 55 million 
tons in 1942-43. The only other significant delivery was the 
emergency provisionment of some 100 tons of eating and seed 
potatoes in 1941. Offsetting these German deliveries were Belgian 
ones to the Reich, which increased during the o.c.cupation. From 
the standpoint of nutrition, the most significant of them were 
fruit and vegetables (27,200 tons in 1942 and 7300 tons in 1943), 
meat (3900 tons in 1943) and horses (10,790 units in 1942 and 
6270 in 1943). The Military Administration estimated that the_ 
value of such deliveries reduced by half the food exports of 
. 17 Germany to Belgium. 
The Wehrrnacht units and personnel stationed in the Command 
Area was still a further drain on Belgian resources. Their seizures 
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and black·market purchasi~g made a mockery of·officialr~sulation 
and created h~ge_gaps in"theBe;tgian food_ supply. It was thanks 
mainly to the strenuous efforts of the Military Administration 
that their· excesses were at least partially curbed. In ~elgium 
as presumably elsewhere in occupied Europe, the armed services 
were under standing orders to provision themselves locally to 
the maximum ~xtent possible. 18 Since the many Army, Air Force, 
and Navy contingents scattered throughout the l.and had no idea 
as to what they could count on in the way of food supplies from 
home and were also quite disinterested in the impact of their 
purchasing on Belgian living standards, th~ occupation began with 
a mad scramble on the part of troop units and individual personnel 
for available food. In shqrt, they seized or bought at wildly 
inflated prices as much as their powers permitted. 
The Military Administration took· two important sets of 
measures in the attempt to wrest order out of this chaos. The 
first of them, of September 1940, was to put Belgian growers and 
processors of c.ertain products under exclusive delivery contracts. 
Agreements were arrived at for canned meat, sugar, chocolate, 
deciduous fruits, nuts, and chicory. 19 The Military Administration's 
reports for the following months provide eloquent.testimony of· 
the inadequacy of such arrangements. In the five weeks b~ginning 
l September 1940, for instance, various troop units were known 
·:. to have seized 18 , O O O cattle and 12,000 pigs, more than the amounts 
. 20 
authorized for the entire quarter. In January 1941, German 
military police broke up a band of smugglers ·.-:hich included thirty 
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civilians and fifty railroad ot~i.cials and wa,s run by ''Jewish 
emigrants. 11 . In its. books appeared the names of numerous troop 
· 21 
unit paymasters. The report complained the following month 
of the common practice, so subversive_of Belgian polici~g efforts, 
whereby staffs and units of the Wehrmacht used their official 
seals (Dienstsiegel) to "authorize" Belgian dealers to make 
black market purchases on their behalf. 22 
The Military AdministrationJs second and more important 
step, taken August 1941, was to vest exclusive powers for food 
· . 23 
purchasing and distribution in Belgium with the Military Intendent. 
A month later the OKW agreed to principle that the Wehrmacht . 
should rely more heavily on provisionment from the home country. 
It.was thought possible to.announce to the Bel.gian public that 
in the future the forces of occupation would cease to draw supplies 
of fat, bread, meat, and potatoes from the land. 24 More important, 
however, than any announcement of intentions was the fact that by 
August 1941 the troops had completed the planting on seized land 
their first potato crop. It was expected that the 85,000 Morgen 
in question would yield 679,476,000 Pfund or enough to supply 
5 million Belgians with five hundred grams per day for three and 
one-half months! 25 
It is impossible to arrive at better than crude estimates 
of Wehrmacht consumption of Belgian foodstuffs, since so much of 
it went on outside of the purview of the Military Administration. 
Figure I provides a list of official Wehrmacht seizures in September 
1940 to January 1941. The Leistungsberichte of 1~42/1943 and 
. . 




(September 1940 - January 1941) 
Pork 12,0.00 heads (9/40 1/41) 
Cattle 18, 0_00 heads (9/40 -=- 1/41) 
Butter. 1,500,000 kg (9/40 - 1/41) 
Beans 3000,tons (9/40 - 11/40) 
Sugar 10,000 tons (9/40 - 11/40) 
Potatoes 50,000 tons (9/40 - 11/40) 
Ri.Ce . · 1000 tons (9/40 - 11/40) 
Jams 8000 tons {9/40 - 11/40) 
Chocolate 3000 tons 
Oats 30,000 tons 
(from Fernand Baudhuin, L'Economie Belge sous 
l'Occupation allemande, Brussels~ 1945, p. ) 
1943/1944 estimate official delivers to the Militaryintendent 
at 199,300 tons (37,760,000 RM) and 304,400 {45,560,000 RM} the 
following: }·e;;:.r, about four-fifths the amount ·of Belgian agri:::ultural 
exports to -Germany for the years in question. These estimates 
include, however, only a few specified items, notably hay (20,000 
tons for both years}, straw (95,000 and 135,000 tons), potatoes 
(25,000 and 40,000 tons), .and sugar (5000 and· 600~ tons) • 26 
According to Colard, these figures contain important omissions. 
He claims to have seen 1941 and 1942 bills of lading for Belgian 
.. goods from the office of the Military Intendant for 62,540 tons 
of sugar, 64,263 tons of flour, 6570 torts of barley,· 9157 tons 
· 27 
of beans, and 303,510 tons of straw. Colard, however, also 
considers these figures too low, even for the years in question, 
and, in a comparison between CNAA food collections and distributions 
to Be;lgians arrives at the following figures for "probable" 
Wehrmacht consumption of foodstuffs raised in Belgium during 
the first half of the occupation. 
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J?igure II 


























(From Jean Co lard, L 'Alimen ta tion de ·1a Belgique 
sous l'Occupation Allemande 1940-1944, {Louvain, 
1945), pp. 161-66.) 
Whether the second half of the occupation brought a reduction 
in consumption by the armed forces cannot be determined. The 
same is true as concerns the extent of Wehrrnacht reallocations 
to Belgians employed in armaments factories. Nor do these 
estimates include black market purchasing. Data concerning it 
is scarce indeed. In September 1942, the Military Administration 
claimed great success in having reduced resort to unofficial 
'28 markets in the year since centralizing procurement. On the 
other hand, Wehrmacht allowances for food shipments to the Reich 
were raised in April 1942 (to compensate for a reduction in 
German rations) to the generous level of 5 kg ~er man/week. 29 It 
seems J?lausible to conclude, then, that a shift occured midway 
through the occupation from unit to individual purchasing. It 
-14-
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did not, .however, _effect volume ·s~gnificantly. There is 
general agreement that thro~ghout the occupation Germans in 
uniform, or their representatives, paid twice as much on food 
black markets as Be~gians. 30 
Production control was, .. of course, _the. most important 
component of food policy in the occupied country~ To put it 
into effect, the Military Administration had to begin from 
scratch. The Belgians took on their own almost none of the steps 
essential to prepare the country for the contingency of German 
occupation. This is a very puzzling fact, and the usual explanation--
belief that a Wor14 war I-type food mission would solve all 
problems--is not very persuasive. Nor is a plea of ignorance. 
Methods for achieving self-sufficiency were well-understood, 
indeed already demonstrating their efficacy in another nation 
which depended· on foreign· sources for one-half its food consumption 
requirements, Switzerland. 
The Swiss began preparing for the contingency of war with 
the appointment of a Delegierter fur Kriegswirtschaft in April 
1937. Conversion to self-sufficency in foodstuffs production 
was a central part of the overall planning effort. The ~ask, 
undertaken by a commission headed by Friedrich T_. Wahl.en, called 
above all for the conversion of some 183,479 ha of grazing land 
in ordeJ;" to increase famland to504,812 ha. The importation of 
fee.dgrains could thereby be eliminated without causing a 
. . . 
correspondi~g reduction in livestock which, on its part, would 
pe fed on feedlots rather than_ grazed. ·Wahlen expected to provide 
;:. 
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the aver~ge Swiss wi.th 300,0 calories' per day includi~g 80_ grams 
of protein and 50-70_ grams of fat. The first st~ge of the plan 
was introduced in September 1939. It :was not put fully into 
effect during the war itself iri part because Swiss authorities 
discovered that a ration level of 2400 calories per day was 
better for health than the planned 3000~ Still, thanks to the 
Wahlen Plan, which added over 1000 calories to the daily diet, 
· Switzerland found it possible to live without either grain 
31 
imports or rationing of v~getables and ·potatoes during the war. 
In August 1939 the economist Fernand Baudhuin proposed a 
plan for agricultural autonomy based on the Swiss model. If 
adopted~ it might well not only have increased the supply of 
\ 
food but changed the political climate of the occupation. Baudhuin 
argued that it would be possible to provide an _average per capita 
diet of 2500 calories by putting 240,000 ha of grazing land into 
cultivation, raising cattle only for milk, making use of low fat 
milk products normc;:1.lly fed only to cattle, and. encouraging the 
consumption of pork as a source of protein. In September and 
October 1939 the Belgian government published the decrees necessary 
to begin the conversions but· "becau·se of a bad winter. • · • and the 
resistance o.f the Defense Ministry to releasing the necessary 
32 
labor ••• the plan remained a dead letter~" 
Indeed, the only Belgian food decrees to have taken effect 
wei;e rather modest ones orderi~g an increase in stocks. One, 
providing for a special tax to cover storage costs, required 







they had risen to 330,0_00. tons,· enough _for two months· consumption. 
Another ·decree ordered margarine producers-to constitute oil 
reserves sufficient for thr.ee months output. A- third ordered an 
increase in stocks of frozen meat (insignificant as a percent~ge 
. -33 1 
of overall meat consumption) to cover six months normal requirements. • 
These, however, were the only .measures to increase the food 
supply enacted by the Belgian gove_rnment prior to the occupation 
which, in addition did nothing to set up an organization capable 
of administering a food policy for the nation. 
CNAA was created to fill the vacuum in food policy. At 
first, the Military Administration attempted to work thro4gh 
existing structures. On 4 Jun_e 1940 it described as "good" 
cooperation with the two Ministries of Food and Agriculture. 36 
A·s of l August, however, _it had been decided to combine t~em under 
secretary General De Winter, then recently returned_from a flight 
to the south of France, in order to make it possible to deal in 
comprehensive fashion with problems of production, processing, 
and rationing. 35 It soon became apparent, however, that the 
bases for a food policy simply had not been laid. The land 
cadaster dated from 1929 and was comp~etely inadequate. It was-
well-neigh impossible to arrive at meaningful estimates of 
available foodstocks, a situation due to Wehrmacht seizures as 
well as the inadequacies of the Belgian administration. Price 
controls and rationing existed only on paper. Above all, nothing 
ha.d been done to prepare. the cultivators fo·r the introduction 
36 of·production controls. 
. . 
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On 27 A.~gust 1940, _amidst_ great fanfare, _the ·corporation 
. . 
nationale de l'Agriculture et de ·1 1·Alimentation was created as-
a Belgian analogue to the Reichsnahrstand (the German Food Estate). 
The new organization was presented to the public less as the 
product of the emergency conditions·of war than as something 
that would put the agriculture of the country on a new footirg 
in the period of· peace to follow it. Vast powers were bestowed·-
on the new entity. It could not only regulate-production but 
abolish existing associations of producers, suspend or shut 
down the operations of processors, regulate sales and consumption, 
and impose dues and penalties on enterprises. Membership was 
compulsory fo_r all producers and processors who, as in the Reich, 
were obliged to market through so"'.'"cal.led Conunodi ty Group . 
Authorities. There were ten CGAs:. Grain and Feed; Milk, Fat 
and Eggs; Livestock and Meat; Horticulture,-vegetables, and Fruit; 
Seeds and Fertilizer; sugar and Commercial Specialty Crops; 
·potatoes; Fish and Fish Products; Breweries, Malt Factories, 
Pistilleries, -and Beverages; and Groceries. While some CGAs, for 
instance for fish, appear to have had little more than a shadow 
existence, others established depots at the major market centers 
for crop and livestock collection. Representatives of producers 
and processors served as "honorary trustees·" of the CGAs at the 
provincial level but-professional staff of CNAA performed the 
administrative labors. Policy was of course made at headquarters 
in B_russels. It soon mushroomed into a h~ge apparat with the 
full panoply of "functional departments" for _personnel and legal 
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questions, press and public relations, _statistics and research, 
production technique,production goals, production supplies and 
means of production, and professional organization and .arbitration. 
But while the new o~ganization employed tho1..1sands of paper 
shufflers, data_ gatherers, snoopers,. "controller.s;" official 
ideologists; .and p.r. men, it was woefully short of technical 
personnel. The chief of CNAA, De Winter, was a mining engineer 
by training and among his deputies was to be found not a single 
' . 
· 37 figure· with_ a background in agriculture. · 
:All Belgian commentators who endured the occupation agree 
in condemning the CNAA. Baudhuin's scathing remarks are 
representative. He judged it necessary "To put M. De Winter 
before the pillory in the. fape o:L history_ as a means. _of providing 
an example to all those who are entrusted with responsibilities 
for which ·they are not suited and to all persons in power 
(dirigeants) who because of. • • incompetence. -~ • and presumption 
accept high office only to plunge their.country into unutterable 
misery. 1138 In short, the CNAA has become .the scapegoat for the· 
food problems of the occupied nation. While admittedly difficult 
to defend, the Corporation deserves this role only in part. In 
fact, _it lacked the power to act more constructively than it did. 
The first count in the Belgian indictment of CNAA concerns 
pr~ce policy •. But while it points to the existence of a real 
• evil, it misplaces blame for it. The main culprit was the overall 
system of wage and price controls instituted by the Military 
Administration and supported by the authors of the "Politics of 
Figure III 
Retail Food Prices During the Occupation 
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Production.'' . CNAA played merely a supporting role in maintaining 
it. The economic facts in the ·case against CNAA price policy· 
are indisputable. food prices, it is .a~gued. 1 _were set so low that 
cultivators, who wei.-e obliged to buy seed and fertilizer on black 
markets, .had no choice but to sell on them as well. 3 9 As Figure III 
indicates, a. huge gap existed between official prices, which 
roughly doubled during the occupation, and black markets prices, 
which skyrocketed. It is also evident that if some approximation 
of the market clearing price had been adopted additional farm 
output would have flowed into official channels, ration levels 
could have been raised, and ~ood distributed on a more equita~le 
basis. ··To have increased prices to such levels' would, however, 
have dest::::-o:i-·ed the emplo:t·ee incentive to report fer work. Wages 
and salaries were raised only 10 percent during the occupation. 
E~en at the artificially low official levels, food costs--as 
numer_ous studies of the sociologist Jacquemyns attest--absorbed 
over sixty percent of the budget of typical worki~g class famili.~s. 4 O 
The Military Administration and the di~ectors of Belgian finance 
and industry both opposed the obvious corrective to this situation, 
a wage increase, on the grounds that it would raise production 
costs. As a matter of policy they preferred to feed workers at 
the plant and force their wives, children and retired parents· to 
deal on the black market even though such activity was forbidden 
by strict penalties. CNAA deserves censure for having enforced. 
this policy--:--for serving as the corrupt and hypocritical controleur 
' 
on an ''illegal" ma,rket whose existence was nearly. as essential for 
the success of German policy of economic exploitation as it·was 
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The ·second count of the indictment against CNAA. concerns the 
failure to undertake the necessary large-scale conversions from 
pasturage to farmla.nds. The Corporation•~ record in this respect 
was indeed a dismal one. As indicated in Figure IV, cereal 
acreage in cultivation increased from 468,000 ha in 1940 to 555,000 
in 1944, _but never reached the 600,000 of 1929 or even the 585,000 
of 1938. It is nonethe~ess somewhat shortsighted to condemn 
these results a la Baudhuin as if they were due _solely to the 
technical incompetence of CNAA policy-makers. More important 
considerations were in play, .above all the questionable ability 
of the organization to impose policy on a farm population unused 
to controls, suspicious of central authority, divided into two 
language blocs, and, above all, .6perating in a ~ell~r•s market •. 
Both the Military Administration and CNAA believed, in short, 
that a policy of conversion ran unacceptable political risks. 
. . 
While recognizing its desirability, even necessity, neither one 
was willing to do the job. This, at any rate, was the outcome 
of protracted discussions between the two in September and October 
1940. The opportunity, once missed, would not, however, return. 4 ~ 
The near-famine situation of Winter 1940-1941 undermined the· 
confidence of the Belgian public in the Military Administration's 
competence in matters of food policy to such an· extent that the 
imposition of conversions on a large scale was never a serious 
possibility thereafter. The matter did not come up again. 
Whether intentionally or not, _the production controls set 
up by CNAA and the Military Administration work.~d in such . a way 
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as to provide the cultivate~ wi.th_ generous surplusses to sell 
on grey.· o:i:: black ma:i::kets. They may not in. fact have had much 
choice in the matter. First, they faced political problems 
which undermined the ·attempt to lay the basis for comprehensive 
planning on the Reich model. Initially, _the Military Administration 
entertained high hopes of winning over the volkstilmlich and 
conservative peasantJ;y, particularly in Flanders, 42 to the New 
Order. Instead, they encountered constant foot-dragging which, 
at times, broke·out into open resistance. The.land.surveys 
taken each spring, for instance, invariably resulted in gross 
underestimates of cropland and were worthless as planning tools. 
The attempt of summer 1942 to introduce the Hofkarte 
(described by Brandt as the essential source of the r·aw data 
for the compilation of running surveys of the national food 
supply situation) touched off armed resistance among the peasantry 
of the Ardennes, necessitated Gestapo intervention and exemplary 
punishment (deportation to KZs), and had to be dropped. 43 
The uncertain supply situation also militated against the 
imposition of quotas which were too-high or rigid. Several 
times, for instance, Berlin seized without warning large amounts 
of fertilizer, a normally abundant commodity. In 1940-1941 this 
amounted to 43,000 tons of Thomas slag, and in the following year, 
30,200 tons. In.late 1942,_the Reich also requisitioned 11,500 
·t f t·1· . 44 tons of pu:r;-e ammonia for the production of ni rogen er i izer. 
Transpo:r;-tation problems also created headaches for planners~ In 
✓ 
Spring 1942 a railroad tie-up prevented delivery of 24,000 tons 
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of seed potatoes. For the same reason, _a major deal of December 
1943 with Roumania for 100,000 tons of whe<:1,t could never be 
executed. 45 Under the circumstances, then, it probably made good 
sense not to attempt to control planting but merely to impose 
del.iv.er~ quotas, .whigh, while high enough to meet ration requirements, 
were low and flexible enough to gua~antee the profitability of 
f9:rming. 
These principles in fact governed the "plans de culture" 
adopted for the successive crop years of the occupation. At 
first planned outputs were based on excessively low estimates 
of farm.acreage and yields. Later, as more land entered cultivation, 
delivery quotas were made more flexible. The farmer was, in other 
words, left to dispose of either free land or free crops. The 
gradual increase in land under cultivation has been noted above. 
• As for the quotas, in 1941-1942 the so-called "production unit" 
was adopted as a delivery standard. It corresponded to any of 
the following: 1 kg of breadgrains; 1 kg of barley; 7 kgs of 
potatoes; .8 kg of dried beans; 10 kg of sugar beets; .7 kg of 
· winter colza (for which additional incentives were provided); 
- 46 
.55 kg of summer colza; 10 kg of chicory roots; 2 kg of straw. 
In the same year, so called "contract deliveries" were introduced 
for potatoes. They permitted the consumer to purchase up to 
120 kgs_ per year directly from the_ grower. 47 In 1942-1943, moreover, 
it-became possible for the farmer to dispense with delivery quotas 
by agreeing to plant 70% of his land in rationed crops. The 
amount of the marketable surplusses left after required deliveries· 
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na tu.:r;ally depended on assumpti_ons concerning yields as we11 · as 
amounts of acreage under cultivation. - Cola.:r;d estimat,es, _based 
on-prewar yields and official 1941 acreage under cultivation, 
that 1 million tons of potatoes were raised in addition to the 
2,080,000 tons called for by the delivery quotas. He estimates 
1940 cereal production at _ _533,000 tons instead of the 445-,000 
tons targeted for that year. And in the case of easily-concealed 
poultry, _he notes that the 1941 quota, set at 345 million eggs, 
assumed a laying-hen population of 3 million, as compared to 
a prewar population of 18 million, which he estimates would 
. 48 
produce between 510 and 765 million eggs per- year. 
Doubtless in part thanks to such relative liberality it was 
possibie-to increase output and supplies-on-hand, r3.ise rati0ns 
slightly and, above all, distribute them more-reliably. Statistics 
on Belgian £arm output, even the official portion of it, are very 
approximate for the war years. According to data from the Ministere 
des Affaires Economiques bread grain production rose from 685,000 
tons in 1941 to 721,000 tons, 879,000 tons, and 819,000 tons in 
the following years of the occupation period, rising in the end 
to 92 percent of the 1935-1938 average. Potato output increased 
from 1,609,000 tons, to 2,086,000 tons, 2,212,000 tons, 2,120,000 
tons, and 2, 0_07, 000 tons over the same period, in the final year 
reaching, however, only 64 percent of the 1935~1938 average. 49 
The available official data conc.erning livestock simply do not 
make much sense. In short, the population did not decrease to 
the extent that one would estimate on the basis of the feed and 
;;; 
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fodder supply. It is clear, .first, _that no fee~grain imports 
(l.2 million tons prewar avei~ge) occurred during the occupation 
and, second, that a portion of feed and fodder land was shifted 
to crops for direct human consumption. Domestic feedgrain 
production declined from an annual average of· 640,000 tons from 
1935 to 1938_ to 434,000 tons during the occupation, that of fodder 
beets from 5,538,000 tons and 4,206,000 respectively. (The ;increase 
in oilseed output between 1940 and 1944 was not significant 
·enough to have affected the overall fodder supply.) At the same 
time, however, the official livestock population remained at a 
relatively constant high level. The number .of·_ horses actually 
increased from 246,000 in 1939 to 278,000 in 1944;_the number of 
cattle fell only slightly from l,GG0,000 to 1,440,000 over the 
same years--although a shift occurred from livestock to dairy; 
there was actually an increase in the sheep population, 153,000 
to 1Q9,000, and of goats from an official z~ro to 119,ooo. 50 
\ 
One finds substantial declines only in-two species: the fecund 
and omnivor.ious pig, from 856,000 to 635,000, and the laying hen, 
which, improbably below even.official -statistics concerning egg 
output, officially declined in number to 2~376,000 during the 
· . 51 
occupation. Increases ~n rations reflect only partially the 
geneI;'a.l improvement in the.food supply~ The most significant 
change was the increase of the bread ration in 1943 -from 225 gr/day 
to 300. The potato ration remained until June 1944 at 500 gr/day; 
meat declined gradually after 1940 from 35 gr/day to 20 gr/day by 
June 1944, but the resumption in Spring 1912 of fishing in the 
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Channel somewhat offset the fall; butter and ma.:rgerine remained 
at about the ·initial. level of 14.9_ gr for most of the period. 
More important than such nominal changes, authorized rations 
· 52 
gradually became more easy to obtain. From mid-Summer 1942 
until the end of the· occupation, consumers seem to have had 
comparatively little difficulty in securing- wpat was officially 
their due. Until :then, however, _there. were only three months 
during which more than one-half of the authorized potato ration 
' could .be supplied. 53 Not surprisingly, the Military Administration's 
first annual report described the food supply situation as its 
greatest single worry, indeed" •• ~the key to the production 
54 problem. 11 And well it might have: the food shortages of 1941 
caused thA most direct challenge it would face during the 
occupation. 
It stemmed from two groups, the coal miners and the business 
leaders in Brussels.· At stake were questions of fundamental 
. 
importance for Belgium's lot in Hitler's Europe: would Belgian 
industry work for the German war effort even without food 
compensation for the nation? and would the Military Administration 
succeed in asserting the power to favor in food allocation those 
persons working directly for the interests of the Reich at the 
expense of those who were more expendable? Although the outcome 
hung for a time in the balance, the Military Administration emerged 
triumphant in both cases. 
'rhe food crisis of Winter 1941 came with plenty of notice. 
The military events of Hay and June 1940 disrupted Spring plantings, 
particularly of potatoes. In Summer numerous-and often unauthorized 
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· . 55 
seizures of Wehrmacht troop units depleted foodstocks. By 
the end of A~gust, stocks of both cereals and fat were · rep.orted 
56 
to be at an end. In the following months the ·Military 
Administration reported that food shortages were undermining 
the.effectiveness of the campaign to win the goodwill 9f the 
population~· It warned Berlin specifically that housewives 
were standing in line for hours in vain attempts to secure the 
meagre authorized rations, Belgians blamed shortages of foodstuffs 
on Wehrmacht confiscations, the black market in foodstuffs was 
growing at an alarming rate, and factory workers were not eating 
enough to do a full day's work. By December potatb rations had 
become all but unobtainable in many parts of the country: 
throughout Wallonia, coal miners had appeared in frqnt of city 
halls, waving empty potato sacks in silent protest. It was also 
reported that "pro-German" industrialists were beginning to 
harbor second thoughts about collaborating. 57 
Serious miner strikes broke out in the Squthern Basin and. 
lasted through mid-April 1941. Figure V provides a list of 
outbreaks includ·ing the numbers of strikers and days struck. 
These strikes were not "political," that is directed at changing 
either the work situation or national policies. Those who .struck 
did so only in order to get enough to eat. With the exception 
of the final group of strikers, the Military Administration 
therefore dealt with the work stoppages not as if they were acts 
of <:iefiance but as "objectively justified" (sachlich begrlindet) 
responses to the foo"d shortages. Repressive measures were avoided 
-29-
F~gure v 
The Coal Stri.kes 
Date District Number of Number.of 
Strikers bays Struck 
11 Sept. 1940 , Liege 311·. 1 
7 Oct • 1940 Charleroi 120 1 
. 14 Oct. 1940· Liege 103 1 
26 Oct. 1940. Charleroi 280 2 
29 Oct~ 1940 Liege 180 1 
13 Dec. 1940 Liege 116 1 
19 Dec~ 1940 Liege 150 1 
21 Jan. 1941 Liege 65 1 
22 Jan. 1941 Liege 303 1 
11 Jan. 1941 Liege 166 1 
27 Jan. 1941 Liege 2.809) 
28 Jan. 1941 Liege 3.898) 7 
29 Jan. 1941 Liege 3.437) 
13 Feb. 1941 Mons 2.950 2 
11 Mar. 1941 Liege=l Pit not regis) 
l 14 Mar. 1941 .Lieg~=l Pit not regis) 
27 Mar •. 1941 Mons 330 1 
29 Mar. . 1941 Mons 400 1 
31 Mar. 1941 Mons _860 l 
3 Apr. 1941 Mons s.ooo 1 
4 Apr. 1941 Mons 8.200 1 
5 Apr. 1941 Mons 4.000 1 
10 May · 1941 Liege 1.736 1 
12 May 1941 .. Liege 10. 000 1 
17 May 1941 FK Hasselt 7. 000) 
20 May 1941 FK Hasselt 10.672) 
(from Jahresbericht der Militarverwaltun~ funB.as erste 
Einsatzj ahr. - (Anlage Cl 7) {TS0l/104/1012) 
I 
\ 
~here possible. Instead, the Military Administration enticed 
the miners back to work with food. During these weeks, something 
called Hilfszug Bayern ("Relief Train 'Bavaria'") was shunted 
from mine siding to mine siding. From it, striking workers were 
issued at the pithead food from Belgian stocks by the men of 
the Wehrmacht. At the same time, the district_ governors of the 
Military Administration, the Kormnandanturen, began to set up 
works-kitchens ('i•Jerkskti.chen) to insure that armaments workers 
;; 
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received the full allotment of their "heavy-" and ''very heavy 
- .. 
labor" rations (Schwer.- und Schwerstarbei te;rationen.) 
58 
These 
actions brought to a head the festering crisis in relations between 
the Military Administration and the leaders of Belgian business. 
·It was· bad enough, they felt, that no assurances had been 
✓-
received regarding food imports as compensation for their 
contribution to the Axis. Was the Occupying.Power now to give 
food only to those working in its behalf, in the meantime 
allowing the rest of the population to starve? 
Fear of this possibility triggered a number of'serious 
protests from within the business community, set in.motion a 
serious attempt to circumvent the authority of the Military 
Adi..tinistration, and brought about a reconsideration of the 
"Politics of Production" at the top-level~ of finance and 
industry, which for a time even seemed to betoken an end to 
economic collaboration. The first indication of the new mood 
was a 7 March 1941 letter of protest from the industrial associations 
fo~ coal, steel, manufacturing, textiles, and construction to 
the Secretaries-General (career chiefs of th~ Belgian civil 
service). It demanded that the public be guaranteed a minimum 
standard of nutrition before any additional allocations be made 
to armaments workers. By the middle of the month, manufacturers 
had begun to annul orders on the grounds that employees were too 
undernourished to work. CNAA Chief De Winter even delivered a 
speech blaming the wehrmacht for food shortages~ Coal operators 





Cattier of the Societe Generale .de Belgique, _the laz-gest Be~gian 
holding company, stated openly his further opposition to any 
stock-swaps (Kapitalverflechtungen) with German firms. The 
Chairman of the construction steel car.tel, Joassert, resigned 
in opposition to the effort to. organize an official business 
association (Wirtschaftgruppe) for his industry; the Chambers-
of-Commerce, after having cooperated in this effort, now also 
expressed objections. Tragically, a M. Jottrand o-f the _Mons 
chapter of "Sycobel," the cartel for construction steel, was 
arrested by the Gestapo for having advised the directors of his 
organization to oppose the demands of the Occupying. Power_ "with 
all the means at their disposal. 1159 The unauthorized trip of 
Governor Galopin of the Societe·Gen~rale to Berlin in the last 
week of March,_ which·in fact Military Administration Chief Reeder 
tried to prevent, culminated the "passive resistance" of the 
businessmen. Thanks apparently to the good offices of Director 
Abs of the Deutsche Bank, Galopin-managed to present the Belgian 
case for -specia_l treatment in 'food matters 'to t·he senior officials 
of several ministries. Although the details of the Galopin 
. . t k 1.· t b · f 'l GO mission are no nown, was an o v1.ous a1. ure. -
Belgian capitulation followed in short order, at a meeting 
convoked by Galopin for 1 April 1941 at the corporate headquarters 
of.la Generale. some twenty~four dignitaries from-the world of 
business pa:i:-ticipated, bankers and industrialists mainly but-also 
a few powerful lawyers and at least one well-known economist. 




followed, in particular as r~gards the lack of German reciprocity 
in foodstuffs. In the end, however, there was unanimity that 
a break with the "Politics of Production" could not be considered. 61 
As concerns the second issue, .namely opposition to . the Military 
Administration's "favoritism" of armaments workers in respect 
·' 
to food allocation, employers had little choice but drop the 
insistence on "equal rations for all Belgians" arid follow the 
German example. .In short, they set up their own food dispei:iseries, 
supplied f.rom the black market, in order to provide the necessary 
incentives to keep employees reporting for work •. This "food 
paternalism" became nearly universal in Belgian industry, taking 
on truly massive proportions. Firms supplied not only prepared 
meals to "heavy" and "verc1 heavy" laborers, but eventually also 
goods in k_ind that could be taken home to feed families. The 
\ 
Military Administration estimated that food supplements added 
36 percent -to wage and salary costs. The various Kontrolldienste 
had orders specifically not to in~erfere with black market food 
procurement by firms, in part because the highly profitable big 
firms·could easily bear the expenses involved. 62 More importantly, 
~seven the official history of the Military Administration's 
price control unit admits, l'without such illegal employer supplements 
. · . 63 
the situation of the worker would have been unbearable." 
While it is evident that Belgian employers no less than the 
Occupying Power and the Be~gian public depended on the black 
market in food, the thing itself must remain something of a 
mystery. For obvious reasons the evidence concerning it is 
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scanty. Still, a few conclusions_can be reached with regard 
to supply and distribution. The ·11 unofficial farm output," that 
is -the surplusses left for cultivators to dispose of, was surely 
one important source of supply. The amounts involved can only· 
be guessed at. One must begin with mention that during the 
occupation neither official outputs nor acreage for cereals 
reached 90 percent of the 1929 total. Even this figure represents 
~hi~ - . 
only---y-- percent of total farm and grazing land. It is unclear 
how much of this additional land was actually in cultivation. 
Colard's estimate, the only one available, sets wheat acreage 
in cultivation at no less than twice the official figure. 64 _ 
It must also be assumed that cultivators were able to dispo·se 
freely of /:I. portion of the output from registered cropland. The 
rule in effect after 1942 that cultivators could dispense with 
quotas by planting 70 percent of their official holdings with 
ration~d crops indicates that CNAA was prepared to permit 
. 
unofficial sale, or consumption, from 30 percent of the total. 
The "miniplots" provided a second important source.of supplementary 
food. Before the war, there were some 838,883 "midget farms" of 
less that one hectare. Normally non-commercial uni ts a.nd too 
small to supervise, they totalled some 130,000 hectares or slightly 
more· than 7 percent of total farm area~ 5 The addition of parks, 
lawns, gardens and vacant lots probably added another 1 •. 5-25 percent 
to total land in cultivation. There was, finally, a huge traffic 
in goods smuggled into the country from France and the Netherlands. 
Statistical evidence concerning it is most scanty of all. It is 
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there~ore. wm:;th mentioni~g that ~gr:icultural oj;:f;icials in the 
two Departments of; France attached to the Germ~·n military 
,. 
gove:t;"nrnerit in Brussels believed that in 1941:no less than 80,000 
tons of breadgra,in was smuggled from their t4rritory into Belgium.
66 
I 
If so, .it would have added ten percent to th7 Be~gian supply for 
that year. 
. . 
In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that food from 
! 




The data available concerning cons.umptibn confirms this_ 
i 
supposition. The OSS estimated average Belgian 1943-1944 
'consumption at 2020 calories; 
worker family consumption" at 
the League of ~ations, "average 
I . 
: . -
2335 calo~ies·ber capita. 67 If 
colard is correct ih stating that the averag¢ Belgian received 
only about 1000 calories per day from officikl rations, then the 
importance of the black market in the ·Belgia~ di_et is self-evident. 
I 
Even the Military Administration had to admit that it indeed 
provided the margin of survival. Its report:of June through 
I 
' 
September 1941 related that a German inspectbr of the Louvain 
! 
l 
federal prisoµ had recently discovered that ~ts inmates, who 
received official ~ations and presumably nothing more, had begun 
6 8 Th t h d t b . I. . d d . th. 1 t -to starve en masse. ey oo a o e prpvi e wi supp emen s. 
i . > 
i 
Because of the lack of any symstematic 1study of food 
! 
distribution by class and region, _little mor:e can be said about 
. I 
the ~atter at this point than what has been ]~uggested above, 
except that access to black market .food, or jproviders of it, was 
I . i 
a more important determinant of how one ate :than professional 
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rank or earning power. The :power to obt3.in food, in other 
words, depended less on the amount one was ·able to spend than 
on proximity to stocks, _the political powe:i:- of one's 
employer, the amount of time one could spend in deali~g on the 
_ black market, regional dif f e:tentials in prices, _and only in 
the final instances on earnings which were, in any case, both 
frozen and eroded by inflation. Certain groups, it is obvious, 
fared relatively well, while others languished. The distinction 
between the two, not to mention those within each group, is, 
however, by no means always clear. 
It was simply taken for_ granted-by all concerned that the 
cultivators of Belgium's 300,000 farms would be allowed to 
maintain prewar levels of consumption. All commentators on the 
food problem agree that they q.id. Baudhuin believes that they 
consumed, among other things, the bulk of the phantom pork 
l . 69 f . d f h popu ation. _ Another ortunate group co·nsiste o t ose owning 
the 800,000 plots of less than one hectare. To it belonged the 
_members of one out of every 2.5 Belgian families. It should be 
emphasized that many of the 11midget farms" were owned by ·artisans, 
\factory workers, and miners and worked on a part time basis by 
their families. ''Heavy" and "very heavy workers" also fared 
better than average, although hardly well. - According to a League. 
of Nations report, they consumed at 82 percent of the prewar 
7(J 
rate.as compared to 74. percent for other work~rs. Even tho~gh 
the total amounts involved were not significant, -it should be 
added that members of the Belgian ss, miscellaneous political 
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Figure VI 
Loss or Gain in Weight* 
-Number of cases of weight loss 
greater than 1.5 kg 
-Number of cases of weight gain 
Average amount of weight loss 
Average amount of weight gain 
*Based on studies of 10,000 workers. 
May 1939-






end of 1943 
1 1 . 8.% 
54.3% 
1 , 7 8 O kgs 
(From Jacquemyns, La Societe Belze sous l'Occu ation Allemande 
1940-194. Privations et Espoirs Brussels, 1946) 
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collaborators, _and favored officials also received "very heavy 
labor" rations. And i:.he.obvious point must a1so be made that 
those persons and professional_ groups well"'."positioned to traffic 
on the black market ate better than those who were not. It may 
also be true, as Jacguemyns suggests, that inhabitants of 
regions bordering France and the Netherlands generally had more 
to eat than those of the interior. 71 The one general category 
not benefiting from any of these advantages was the residents 
of the big cities-~Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, and Liege--especially 
workers in the service industries, government employees, office 
workers, pensioners, and their dependents. (Children and 
pregnant women received modest food supplements.) All descriptions 
confirm the impression that this group bore a disproportionate 
share of the suffering. 
_Public health fell catastrophically during the first nine 
months of the occupation, stabilized, then improved slightly 
over the rema:i.ning months prior to Liberation. As indicated 
by Figure VI weight losses of five to ten kg were not uncommon 
during the first period but soon after made up thanks to both 
changes in physical metabolism and improvements in the food 
supply. An increase in the incidence of only one malady has been 
traced back to the austere diet of the·occupation years,. 
· \...the number of_ _ _g~13:1;hs from which rose from 4415 in 1939 to a wa.~ime maximum __ / 
tunerculosrs, wh,;icfi.--~.om - '1---- of~-641lr- in 1941 
and which. afflicted the Charleroi area with special severity. The 
much-feared "hunger edema'' did not put in a signif·icant appearance. 
The dietary situation also had negligible effect on rates of 







The history of Be~gian food supply problems during World 
war II, sad though it is, has a hopeful side as well. Even 
without benefit of· planning, the nation· proved.able to feed 
itself. It disposed; in short,·of resources and strengths of 
which it was_ not fully aware. Planning on the Swiss model 
might well have made it possible to have raised output somewhat 
and surely would ·have provided the basis for more equitable_ 
distribution than that which took place-. It is also possible, 
however, that better organization and additional production 
would only have profited the Occupying Power. The rea.l difference 
in ·having or not having a policy for agricultural self-sufficiency 
was felt on the export side. The "Politics of Production" was 
.·. 
at least in part a response to the belief that Belgium could 
not live without food imports. If Belgians had enjoyed the same 
confidence as the Swi~s that they could indeed grow enough 
to provide for their consumption requirements it might well have 
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